Contemporary models of psychedelic action hold that clinical outcomes arise from an interaction between a pharmacologically induced brain state and the lived experience that unfolds within it. Research effort is distributed very unevenly across those two domains: pharmacological variables receive dose-finding trials, power calculations, and effect-size estimates, while the variables that shape experience are frequently unreported, rarely manipulated, and almost never compared. I argue that this imbalance rests on a conceptual error about what is being administered, and propose that the object of psychedelic therapy is best understood as the pharmacologically scaffolded experience. On that basis I describe the Pharmacology-Experience Asymmetry and develop a framework (PEAF) built on six postulates: the intervention comprises two conceptually distinguishable components; therapeutic mechanisms span two partially differentiable domains; the elements that organize experience constitute a specifiable class of experiential inputs, with a taxonomy and a fixed-to-adaptive delivery axis; measurement effort is asymmetrically distributed between domains; several current conventions may represent crystallized methodological decisions rather than conclusions from comparative evidence; and investigative effort should be approximately proportional to the causal weight attributed to each domain. I distinguish experiential inputs, process, and outcomes, examine why the asymmetry has persisted for six decades, and address anticipated objections. Music serves as the illustrative case: a recent scoping review identified 19 papers from 10 studies across five decades, with one fully factorial design and one no-music arm, published in 1970. Five testable predictions are derived, including one that requires no new participants. Treating experiential inputs as tractable variables rather than uncontrolled background would allow psychedelic research to investigate them with methodological effort proportionate to the causal weight assigned to experience by its own mechanistic models.
